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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Legal issues regarding nuclear weapons policies have emerged recently 
in response to new threats arising from a broadening of nuclear doctrines 
amongst the pre-existing nuclear weapons States (NWS), plans for the 
development of new types of nuclear weapons, proliferation of nuclear 
weapons to other States, the emergence of  pre-emptive use of force as a 
response to suspected proliferation of nuclear weapons, increasing tensions 
between States possessing nuclear weapons, and possible acquisition and 
use of nuclear weapons by non-State actors. 
There is thus an increasing urgency for the strengthening of legal norms 
to constrain the possession, threat or use of nuclear weapons, and for the 
development of legal regimes to control, reduce and eventually eliminate 
such weapons.  The alternative—a world governed by increasing threats to 
use force, including the use of nuclear weapons—is likely to occur should 
the rule of force not be replaced by the rule of law.  
This article discusses the history of nuclear weapons, current control 
regimes and nuclear doctrine, the inherent instability of current 
discriminatory approaches, the legal status of nuclear weapons and the legal 
implications of the pre-emptive use of force. It also proposes alternatives to 
the use of force for dealing with nuclear proliferation, and the possibility of 
nuclear disarmament through a nuclear weapons convention. 
II.  SHATTERER OF WORLDS OR PROTECTOR OF PEACE?  
PERSPECTIVES ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
I am become death, the shatterer of worlds. 
J. Robert Oppenheimer2 
The birth of the nuclear age created the seeds of two diametrically 
opposed strands of thought regarding nuclear weapons: their role in security 
doctrine and their legality.  The first strand originated from U.S. President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s decision to create the first nuclear weapon and 
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President Truman’s decision to use it against Japan.3  This strand confers 
positive value on the possession of nuclear weapons by a limited number of 
“responsible” states in order to protect the security of those states,4 their 
allies,5 and the rest of the “law-abiding” world from aggressive states or 
“rogue” governments.  The other strand originates from scientific, 6 
diplomatic,7 legal,8 and public reaction9 to the first development and use of 
nuclear weapons.  It holds that nuclear weapons are inhumane, immoral, 
illegal, and inherently destructive of regional and international security. 
The two strands of thought have evolved into very different, and mostly 
contradictory, approaches to dealing with nuclear weapons.  The first, a 
combination of deterrence and counter-proliferation, is the preferred 
approach of the NWS and their allies.  It relies on the threat or use of force, 
including the threat or use of nuclear weapons by an elite nuclear club10 and 
their allies, against all others who may threaten their interests or have 
nuclear ambitions of their own.  This approach is one of international power 
politics,11 as opposed to consistent application of international law.12 
The second approach, adhered to by the majority of states,13 favours 
disarmament rather than deterrence and counter-proliferation and calls for 
the comprehensive and universal abolition of nuclear weapons under 
international supervision. 14   It also includes the strengthening of legal 
mechanisms for the development of international security, as opposed to the 
strengthening of military doctrine and capabilities.  It is thus an approach 
favouring the application of international law over international power 
politics.15 
III.  OPENING THE FLOODGATES: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 
A.  Nuclear Weapon States 
In 1995, a commission of disarmament experts, including former French 
Prime Minister Michel Rocard, former head of U.S. Strategic Command 
General Lee Butler, and former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert 
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McNamara, warned that “[t]he proposition that nuclear weapons can be 
retained in perpetuity and never used—accidentally or by decision—defies 
credibility,” and that “[t]he possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a 
constant stimulus to other states to acquire them.”16 
Following the use of nuclear weapons against Japan in 1945, there 
emerged the possibility that these weapons could be abolished, with both 
the United States and the USSR supporting a UN commission that held a 
mandate to work for nuclear disarmament.17  However, the ensuing Cold 
War prevented a nuclear elimination regime from being developed.  
Instead, there was a colossal build-up of nuclear weaponry, until each of the 
Cold War antagonists possessed over 25,000 nuclear weapons, most of 
them 100–1,000 times the explosive force of the Hiroshima bomb.18 
At the end of the Cold War, there were hopes that global nuclear 
disarmament would finally materialize.  Prior to the breakup of the USSR, 
President Gorbachev announced a plan for the complete elimination of 
nuclear weapons by the year 2000.19  While Gorbachev’s plan was not 
implemented, the NWS did negotiate a treaty, which was concluded in 
1996, to prohibit the testing (by detonation) of nuclear weapons20 as a first 
step to nuclear disarmament.  Additionally, the United States and the 
USSR/Russia concluded a number of nuclear arms control treaties in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s.21 
These steps, however, serve merely to placate the expectation for 
disarmament and divert the attention of the world, while the NWS develop 
new means for testing nuclear weapons and new types of weapons and 
delivery vehicles.  The United States, for example, continues to spend $4 
billion annually on nuclear weapons research and development, 
modernizing its Trident submarine missiles, deploying a new B61-mod11 
nuclear bomb, and developing new “low yield” nuclear warheads.22  There 
are no plans by the NWS to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons any 
further, which now include 15-20,000 warheads.  Nearly 5,000 of these 
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TABLE I: GLOBAL STOCKPILES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS1 
 
              Strategic delivery    Deployed       Total 
   Systems2   Warheads   Warheads 
 
     U.S.        1097 7206   10,500 
     Russia        1122 5826   20,000 
     China          250     400       400 
     France          132   348       348 
     UK            48   185       185 
     Israel            -     -     ~150 
     India            -     -       ~80 
     Pakistan            -     -       ~20 
 
 Total warheads  ~31,700 
 Total yield      5,000 Mt 




 Nuclear Forces Guide, Federation of American Scientists at http://www.fas.org/ 
 nuke/guide/index.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). 
 Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen, NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Global Nuclear 
Stockpiles 1945–2002, BULL. OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Nov./Dec. 2002, at 103–04, 
available at http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/nd02nukenote.html. 
 JOSEPH CIRINCIONE, JON B. WOLFSTHAL, & MIRIAM RAJKUMAR, TRACKING NUCLEAR 
PROLIFERATION (2002). 
1 Sources vary in numbers due to uncertainty over status of some weapons removed from 
deployment. 
2 Israel, India, and Pakistan are reported to have not yet deployed nuclear weapons, but 
have short-medium range missiles that could be used for deployment. 
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B.  The Failure of Counter-Proliferation 
In 1968, the risks posed by uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons 
led states to conclude the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, whereby non-
NWS agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons, and the NWS agreed to 
negotiate for complete nuclear disarmament.  However, in the ensuing 
years, the NWS made no progress on implementing their side of the 
agreement,and instead have placed greater emphasis on counter-
proliferation policies rather than disarmament efforts in order to prevent 
proliferation.  Counter-proliferation policies have included trade barriers in 
nuclear and missile technology, economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, 
and threats of force.  These policies have not been successful in preventing 
other states from acquiring or developing nuclear capabilities. 
For instance, India demonstrated a nuclear weapons capability in 1974, 
detonating a device in what India called a peaceful nuclear experiment.  In 
May 1998, India openly tested nuclear weapons and declared itself a 
nuclear weapons power, stating: 
[T]he refusal of the NWS to consider the elimination of nuclear 
weapons … continues to be the single biggest threat to interna-
tional peace and security.  It is because of the continuing threat 
posed to India by the deployment of nuclear weapons that we have 
been forced to carry out these tests.23 
 Pakistan is believed to have started developing its nuclear weapons 
program in 1971, following its war with India.  In response to India’s tests 
in May 1998, Pakistan followed with its own nuclear tests in June 1998, 
thus assuming a declared nuclear weapons status.  
Israel neither acknowledges nor denies that it has nuclear weapons and is 
generally regarded as a de facto NWS.  Mordechai Vanunu, a former 
nuclear technician at the Dimona facility, revealed in 1986 that Israel could 
have up to 200 nuclear warheads.24 
Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is possible for states to acquire 
assistance with nuclear technology for peaceful means25 and later withdraw 
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from the Treaty in order to use that technology for weapons purposes.  In 
2003, North Korea, which had acquired assistance with its nuclear energy 
production from a number of countries, withdrew from the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.  North Korea declared the 1994 Joint Declaration on 
the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula26to be no longer operable,  
and announced its intention to pursue a nuclear weapons policy, citing 
threats from U.S. nuclear weapons as a major reason for these actions.27  
C.  Non-State Actors 
It is hard to imagine how the tragedy of 11 September could have 
been worse.  Yet, the truth is that a single attack involving a 
nuclear or biological weapon could have killed millions. 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan28  
 
The acquisition of a nuclear explosive device, by theft or construction, 
and its threat or use by a terrorist organization, is becoming more likely.  In 
Russia, there is concern over security of their nuclear warheads, particularly 
those decommissioned and on their tactical delivery vehicles.  There is 
particular concern regarding suitcase-sized “mini-nukes,” though even 
larger nuclear weapons could be stolen with a large truck.29  Of even greater 
concern is the possibility that a sub-national group could acquire the key 
ingredients for a nuclear warhead, highly enriched uranium or plutonium, to 
manufacture a bomb.  The smuggling of highly enriched uranium has been 
intercepted on a couple of occasions,30 as has the smuggling of plutonium.31  
While the construction of a nuclear bomb is difficult, the U.S. Office of 
Technology Assessment has reported that it is definitely within the 
capabilities of a non-state group: 
[A] small group of people, none of whom have ever had access to 
the classified literature, could possibly design and build a crude 
nuclear explosive device.  They would not necessarily require a 
great deal of technological equipment or have to undertake any 
experiments.  The group would have to include at a minimum, a 
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person capable of researching and understanding the literature in 
several fields and a jack-of-all trades technician.32 
In other words, as the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear 
War has stated, “[u]nless radical steps are taken urgently, it will not be a 
question of whether terrorists can acquire or build a nuclear device, but 
when.”33  The United States has developed a range of policies to respond to 
the threat of terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons.  These include threats 
to use force against states supporting terrorist groups and the use of nuclear 
weapons in the “war against terror.”34  However, these efforts are not likely 
to have any significant preventative impact on such threats, since terrorist 
organizations do not have their personnel or military equipment 
concentrated in geographical locations that can easily be destroyed, nor are 
they necessarily beholden to the host or supporting governments. 
Therefore, the only way to prevent nuclear terrorism is through nuclear 
disarmament and international control of fissile materials.35  This perspec-
tive is shared by Jyanatha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary-General of the 
United Nations who, following the September 11 terrorist acts in the United 
States, noted that “[w]e need to eliminate WMD [Weapons of Mass 
Destruction] because they could fall into the hands of terrorists.”36   
IV.  OFF WITH THEIR HEADS: RUNAWAY NUCLEAR DOCTRINE  
The players all played at once, without waiting for turns, 
quarreling all the while, and fighting for the hedgehogs; and in a 
very short time the Queen was in a furious passion, and went 
stomping about, and shouting ‘Off with his head!’ or 'Off with her 
head’ about once a minute.   
 Alice began to feel very uneasy: to be sure, she had not as yet 
had any dispute with the Queen, but she knew that it might happen 
any minute, ‘and then’ thought she, ‘what would become of me?  
They’re dreadfully fond of beheading people here: the great 
wonder is, that there’s anyone left alive!’ 
Lewis Carroll.37 
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A.  New Nukes and Plans for Their Use 
NWS do not appear to be curbing nuclear development.  In 2000, at a 
conference of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty,38 the NWS 
made a commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security 
policies and to achieve nuclear disarmament.  Since then, they have shown 
no signs of implementing these commitments, and in some cases are instead   
moving backwards.  For instance, in January 2002, the U.S. administration 
completed a Nuclear Posture Review,39 which affirmed disturbing develop-
ments in nuclear policy including development of “more usuable”40 nuclear 
weapons, and the deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence,41 following 
the United States withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 
2002.42 
The review also included contingency plans for the use of nuclear 
weapons against particular countries including Iraq, Iran, North Korea, 
Russia, China, Libya, and Syria, and an increased readiness for nuclear 
testing, 43  despite the fact that the United States in 1996 signed the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits all nuclear detonations for 
test purposes. 44 
The most dangerous plan is a larger role for nuclear weapons, not just to 
deter a nuclear strike, but to have a role in deterring, or pre-emptively 
destroying, any WMDs.45  This contrasts with negative security assurances 
given by the NWS not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against non-
NWS.  Such negative security assurances were given in order that the non-
NWS would agree to forgo the option of nuclear weapons and were 
reaffirmed in 1995 in order that non-NWS would agree to an indefinite 
extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.46 
The developments in U.S. nuclear doctrine have acted as a stimulus for 
other states to also alter their nuclear doctrines, thus reversing nuclear 
disarmament gains made in the past decade.  Russia has responded by 
rescinding its ratification of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (SALT II).  
Similarly, China has responded by refusing to join other NWS in 
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negotiating a treaty to curtail production of fissile material on the basis that 
it may need to increase its numbers of warheads to deal with the threat from 
U.S. anti-ballistic missile systems. 
B.  Pre-emptive Use of Force 
The most dramatic development affecting international law and nuclear 
doctrine has been the pre-emptive use of force, possibly nuclear force, in 
response to the proliferation of WMD.  The United States and UK justified 
their use of force against Iraq in March 2003 on the basis of pre-emptive 
self-defence to prevent Iraq from using WMD and on the claim that the 
Security Council authorized the use of force to ensure compliance with 
resolutions requiring Iraq to eliminate its WMD.47  This military assault by 
the United States and its small coalition, including the United Kingdom, 
waged on the basis of suspected WMD programs indicates this policy is no 
paper tiger, but rather a very real indication of the types of actions the U.S. 
government will take to pursue its interests.   
The illegality of the pre-emptive use of force against Iraq, the damage 
this precedent could render to international law, and the prevention of 
future use of force was outlined in an International Appeal by Lawyers and 
Jurists against the Preventive Use of Force.  This appeal was endorsed by 
over 300 legal experts from forty countries and was submitted to the United 
Nations by Judge Weeramantry, former Vice-President of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ).48  The appeal recognized that “[t]he development of 
WMD anywhere in the world is contrary to universal norms against the 
acquisition, possession and threat or use of such weapons and must be 
addressed”49 but argued that “the ‘preventive’ use of force currently being 
considered against Iraq is both illegal and unnecessary and should not be 
authorized by the United Nations or undertaken by any State.”50  The appeal 
based its conclusion on a number of principles of international law, 
enshrined in the UN Charter and other legal instruments.  
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In international legal opinion, there is some affirmation of the right to 
pre-emptive use of force as a form of “anticipatory self-defence” if there is 
an imminent threat of attack from an enemy.  However, this right is 
generally held to be restricted in application to instances where there is no 
other choice but to use force.  In other words, while anticipatory self-
defence is “normally unlawful, it is not necessarily unlawful in all 
circumstances, the matter depending on the facts of the situation including 
in particular the seriousness of the threat and the degree to which pre-
emptive action is really necessary and is the only way of avoiding that 
serious threat.”51 
In discussing the use of force in the Caroline Incident of 1837, UK 
Secretary of State Daniel Webster noted that it will be for the government 
to show that the “necessity of [the use of force in] self-defence is instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation.”52  The development of the law over the 150 years since the 
Caroline Incident, and particularly in light of more recent state practice, 
suggests that the use of force by a state can only be justified as self-defence 
under international law if it meets certain criteria.  These are: 
(a) an armed attack is launched, or is immediately threatened, 
against a state’s territory or forces (and probably its nationals); 
(b) there is an urgent necessity for defensive action against that 
attack; 
(c) there is no practicable alternative to action in self-defence, and 
in particular another state or other authority which has the legal 
powers to stop or prevent the infringement does not, or cannot, use 
them to that effect; 
(d) the action taken by way of self-defence is limited to what is 
necessary to stop or prevent the infringement, i.e. to the needs of 
defence. . . .53 
The use of force by the United States and the United Kingdom failed to 
meet any of these conditions.  Iraq had not launched an attack or made any 
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indications it was about to attack the United States, United Kingdom, or any 
other state.  There was no urgent necessity for defensive action against any 
attack.  Alternative actions were being undertaken by the United Nations to 
deal with Iraq’s potential WMDs.54  Finally, the military action by the 
United States did not focus primarily on the supposed threat from WMD, 
but instead on overthrowing the Iraqi government.   
The UN Charter prohibits the use of force by states55 except in the case 
of self-defence in response to an actual attack.56  Article 51 of the UN 
Charter provides states the right to act in self-defence when attacked, but 
only until the Security Council moves to relieve the situation.  The Security 
Council was acting to address the threats posed by Iraq, relieving individual 
states of any right to respond with force.  More importantly, as indicated 
earlier, Iraq had not attacked another state, nor threatened to attack another 
state, and so the Article 51 right to self-defence would not apply even if the 
United Nations was not responding. 
Possession or development of WMD relates more closely to Chapter 7 of 
the UN Charter, regarding a threat to peace.  The Security Council can 
authorize the use of force by states or by UN forces in a situation creating a 
threat to international peace,57 and has done so on a number of occasions.58  
However, the Security Council is generally reluctant to authorize the use of 
force, one reason being that this would imply a failure of the primary aim of 
the United Nations, which is to “save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war.”59  The UN Charter thus provides for recourse to force only 
when methods for restoring peace and security not involving the use of 
force have failed.60  In addition, each time authorization for the use of force 
has been given, it has been in response to actual invasion, large-scale 
violence, or humanitarian emergency.  The Security Council has never 
authorized the use of force based on a potential, non-imminent threat of 
violence.61 
Finally, in the recent case with Iraq, the United States and United 
Kingdom claimed that under Resolutions 678, 62  687, 63  and 1441, 64  the 
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Security Council had authorized members to use force.  However, the 
United States and the United Kingdom found little support for this claim, 
either in the Security Council65 or from legal scholars.66  Resolution 678 
related to the restoration of Kuwait’s sovereignty following the invasion by 
Iraq in 1990, which had been achieved.  Resolution 687 related to the terms 
of surrender and did not include authorization for the use of force.  
Resolution 1441 provided Iraq a “final opportunity to comply with its 
disarmament obligations” 67  and warned Iraq that “it will face serious 
consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations,”68 but 
the resolution did not authorize force.  Instead, if Iraq did not comply, it 
called for the convening of the Security Council “in order to consider the 
situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council 
resolutions in order to secure international peace and security,”69 an indica-
tion that the Security Council had not yet devolved authority for enforcing 
compliance to member states.  
The wording of the Gulf War resolutions show that, when the Security 
Council intends to authorize the use of force, it does so in clear terms.  
Resolution 678 referred to the use of “all necessary means,” phrasing which 
does not appear in any subsequent resolution relating to Iraq.70  The United 
States and the UK acted in accordance with such an understanding when 
they attempted to secure a follow-up resolution to 1444 to specifically 
authorize the use of force, but then failed in this endeavor.  
There are persuasive reasons to support the argument that the United 
States, United Kingdom, and the “coalition of the willing” 71  were in 
violation of international law in conducting the military operation against 
Iraq.  While the Security Council has been unable to condemn the use of 
force against Iraq, 72  in the past it has condemned similar pre-emptive 
military action by one state against another on the grounds of the suspected 
development of WMD.  In particular, the Security Council condemned 
Israel for its pre-emptive strike against an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, 
stating that it “strongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear 
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violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of 
international conduct.”73  A justification for pre-emptive military action was 
also rejected by the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg in 
response to defendants’ argument that Germany was compelled to attack 
Norway to forestall an Allied invasion.74 
The pre-emptive use of force employed against Iraq does not appear to be 
an aberration of special circumstances but an example of U.S. policy in 
action.  This policy now holds that the United States “must be prepared to 
stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or 
use [WMD] against the United States and our allies and friends.”75  U.S. 
President Bush has announced that the United States “will act against such 
emerging threats before they are fully formed.”76   
This new doctrine establishes dangerous precedent that is already 
increasing instability around the world with a number of other states, now 
claiming the same right to use force preventively against other states by 
means of WMD.  For example, tensions between India and Pakistan over 
Kashmir have entered a new and more dangerous dynamic as a result of the 
pre-emptive doctrine precedent.  While  India and Pakistan were previously 
constrained to respond only to an actual attack or military incursions by the 
opposing side, now they feel encouraged to take pre-emptive actions, 
making the likelihood of full-scale war more likely.  Indian Foreign 
Minister Yashwant Sinha has, for example, noted that India has “a much 
better case to go for pre-emptive action against Pakistan than the United 
States has in Iraq.”77 
There is a very real danger that a full-scale war between India and 
Pakistan would quickly turn into a nuclear disaster.  In April and May 2002, 
tensions between India and Pakistan increased dramatically, with leaders 
from both sides acknowledging that nuclear war was very possible.  For 
example, Pakistan’s military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, said that 
Indians should not treat Pakistanis “as if we are some kind of scum, a very 
weak country which cannot handle itself.  We’re not going to crawl.  As a 
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last resort, the atom bomb is also possible.”78  General V.R. Raghavan, 
former Director General of Indian military operations replied that, “India’s 
aggressive plans for fighting conventional wars are now matched against 
Pakistan’s aggressive doctrine for nuclear ones.  An escalation from a 
conventional to a nuclear war, within one or two days of the outbreak of the 
war, is not implausible.”79 
North Korea has responded to the pre-emptive strike precedent by 
claiming for itself a right of preemption in order to respond to threats from 
the United States, South Korea, and Japan,80 and Japan has responded to 
this by suggesting that it may also develop a pre-emptive doctrine against 
North Korea.81  In addition, the pre-emptive use of force by the United 
States against Iraq was a major factor in moving North Korea to withdraw 
from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and pursue a nuclear weapons program 
in order to protect itself from a possible pre-emptive attack by the United 
States.  The Korean Committee for Solidarity with World Peoples explained 
North Korea’s response to the United States war against Iraq by noting: 
The Iraqi war taught the lesson that “nuclear suspicion,” 
“suspected development of WMD” and suspected “sponsorship of 
terrorism” touted by the U.S. were all aimed to find a pretext for 
war and one would fall victim to a war when one meekly responds 
to the IAEA’s inspection for disarmament.  Neither strong 
international public opinion nor [other members of the Security 
Council’s] opposition to war nor the U.N. Charter could prevent 
the U.S. from launching the Iraqi war.  It is a serious lesson the 
world has drawn from the Iraqi war that a war can be averted and 
the sovereignty of the country and the security of the nation can be 
protected only when a country has a physical deterrent force, a 
strong military deterrent force capable of decisively repelling any 
attack to be made by any types of sophisticated weapons.82  
The implications of a pre-emptive doctrine are obvious: each side will 
claim the right to pre-emptively attack the other in order to prevent the 
other from attacking.  The pre-emptive doctrine of the other side can be 
perceived as sufficient proof of an intention to attack, and thus sufficient 
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justification for a pre-emptive attack on the opposing side.  The practice of 
pre-emptive use of force is “in disregard of the principles of international 
law and would threaten the fabric of international law giving rise to the 
potential for further violations and an increasing cycle of violence and 
anarchy.”83 
V.  RULE OF LAW: LEGAL METHODS AND MECHANISMS TO DEAL 
WITH NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 
The Iraq situation has raised a number of questions on how to deal 
effectively with nuclear proliferation, including verification of and ensuring 
compliance with disarmament and non-proliferation obligations.  The 
United States and United Kingdom claimed that the use of force against 
Iraq was required because Iraq was not in compliance with its disarmament 
obligations and because the United Nations failed to enforce these 
obligations by other means. 
An alternative viewpoint, favored by the United Nations Monitoring, 
Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and most of the 
other Security Council members, was that 
(a)  UN mechanisms for verification and enforcement were 
working well.  Iraq was cooperating with the UN and UNMOVIC, 
which was able to confirm that WMD had been destroyed and 
facilities for producing them rendered incapable of continuing 
such production. 
(b)  Whilst it was not possible to ascertain with complete 
confidence that there were no remaining useable WMD, such 
confidence could be achieved given further work by UNMOVIC. 
(c)  In order to achieve full cooperation by Iraq and complete 
confidence, there were additional measures that could be taken not 
involving the use of force against Iraq.84  
The methods and mechanisms, utilized by the United Nations to 
deal with the proliferation of WMD by Iraq, are part of a growing 
body of unilateral and multilateral approaches that have been 
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developed, some very recently, to address proliferation and 
achieve disarmament. The methods include declarations, 
monitoring, inspections, preventive controls, diplomacy, 
negotiation, mediation, adjudication, disarmament assistance 
(voluntary or imposed), and diplomatic and economic pressure, 
including sanctions.85 
In order to implement these methods, organizational and multilateral 
mechanisms have been developed to address disarmament and non-
proliferation requirements.  These include National Technical Means, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), bilateral treaties (e.g., U.S.–Russia, Brazil–
Argentina), UN General Assembly, UN Security Council, and the ICJ.86  
(See Table III). 
With regard to Iraq’s WMD programmes, the UN Security Council estab-
lished mechanisms to employ or implement diplomatic pressure, 
negotiations, sanctions on certain goods with military application, 
destruction of stockpiles of WMD and inspections of facilities with 
capabilities to assist in production of WMD.  Prior to the invasion of Iraq, 
there was sufficient evidence to claim that while these mechanisms were 
not perfect, they worked ‘effectively enough to have led to the destruction 
and curtailment of most of the Iraqi WMD capability.’87 
The United States and the United Kingdom also raised the issue of the 
Iraqi government’s suspected support of terrorism, human rights violations, 
and war crimes of the Iraqi regime as other rationales for the use of force.  
However,  
[m]echanisms are available to address charges against Iraq and the 
Iraqi leadership of serious human rights violations, war crimes, 
crimes against peace and crimes against humanity.  These include 
domestic courts utilizing universal jurisdiction, the establishment 
by the Security Council of an ad hoc international criminal 
tribunal, use of the International Criminal Court for any crimes 
committed after July 2002, and the International Court of Justice.88 
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TABLE II: EXAMPLES OF METHODS TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE OF DISARMAMENT 
AND NONPROLIFERATION OBLIGATIONS 
 
Declarations 
 UN Security Council Resolution 1441 required Iraq to make a complete 
declaration of all aspects of its programs to develop chemical, biological, 
and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems.  
UNMOVIC then compared this declaration with information it had gathered 
through inspections and other sources to develop an account of these 
programs.  
 The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Model Additional 
Safeguards Protocol (1997) requires states parties to declare all nuclear 
facilities and nuclear materials being used or produced in nuclear facilities. 
Monitoring 
 Monitoring technologies currently being employed at nuclear facilities, 
remote stations, or by satellites, include: photography, seismic measuring, 
radio-isotope sampling, data analysis, and portal controls.  An example of 
remote monitoring being used is that of satellite photography, released by a 
non-governmental organization in 1996, which correctly indicated that 
China was about to conduct an underground nuclear test.  
Inspections 
 States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (except the NWS) are subject to routine and challenge 
inspections by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
and the IAEA.  Iraq was subject to more intrusive inspections authorized by 
the Security Council.  The United States and Russia inspect some of each 
other’s missiles under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.   
Preventive controls 
 Preventive controls are technical barriers to the development of WMD or 
their use.  This could include configuration of nuclear power plants to ensure 
that weapons grade fissile material could not be produced and constructing 
access controls on stored nuclear weapons and fissile material. 
Diplomacy 
 With the break-up of the Soviet Union, three new states apart from Russia, 
inherited nuclear weapons: Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.  The U.S. and 
Russia used diplomacy to convince these states to give up their nuclear 
weapons and join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-NWS. 
Negotiation 
 In the 1970s, Brazil and Argentina were developing a nuclear weapons 
program, partly as a result of tensions between the two countries.  
Negotiations between them in the early 1980s on confidence building and 
nuclear non-proliferation were successful, and in 1991, the two countries 
concluded an agreement to forego any nuclear weapons option and inspect 
each others’ nuclear power facilities. 
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Mediation 
 Rainbow Warrior Affair.  In 1985 the DGSE (French Secret Service) 
committed a terrorist act in New Zealand by bombing the Greenpeace boat 
Rainbow Warrior, which was en route to Moruroa to protest against French 
nuclear testing.  New Zealand convicted and sentenced two DGSE agents.  
France responded by placing trade barriers on New Zealand products within 
the European Community.  Mediation by the UN Secretary-General brought 
about a mutually acceptable solution.  New Zealand released the agents to 
France and in exchange, France removed trade barriers and provided 
compensation to Greenpeace and New Zealand.89  
 North Korea 1994.  In 1993, North Korea suspended inspections of its 
nuclear facilities by the IAEA and announced its intention to withdraw from 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  The United States considered using force 
against North Korea to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons.  Former 
U.S. President Carter mediated between the two countries with the result 
that they adopted an Agreed Framework, whereby North Korea suspended 
its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and allowed IAEA 
inspections to resume in return for energy assistance from the United 
States.2  (This agreement however broke down in 2003.) 
Adjudication 
 Nuclear Tests Case.  In 1973, Australia and New Zealand lodged a case 
against France in the ICJ on the legality of French atmospheric testing of 
nuclear weapons in the Pacific.  In 1974, as a result of political and legal 
pressure, France announced it would cease atmospheric testing and only test 
underground.  In 1995, New Zealand called on the ICJ to re-open the case in 
order to include a legal ruling on underground testing.  France discontinued 
underground testing the following year and joined the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty.3  
Disarmament assistance—voluntary or imposed 
 Cooperative Threat Reduction.  This program, initiated by U.S. Senators 
Nunn and Lugar, provides technical and financial aid to Russia in order to 
dismantle and destroy nuclear missiles and safely store fissile material. 
 The UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) was given a mandate by 
the UN Security Council to find and destroy Iraq’s WMD, a task that they 
conducted from 1991 until 1998.  There is no reliable evidence that any 
WMD remained after UNSCOM left Iraq. 
Diplomatic and economic pressure including sanctions 
 The UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Iraq in 1990 and 
extended these until it was assured that Iraq had no remaining WMD in 
2003. 
 
1  See DAVID LANGE, NUCLEAR FREE THE NEW ZEALAND WAY 120-34 (1990). 
2  See JOZEF GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL: THE NEW GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS & AGREEMENTS 339 (2002.) 
3  See KATE DEWES & ROBERT GREEN, AOTEAROA/NEW ZEALAND AT THE WORLD COURT (1999). 
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TABLE III: EXAMPLES OF MECHANISMS TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE OF 
DISARMAMENT AND NONPROLIFERATION OBLIGATIONS 
 
National Technical Means 
 Information gathering by States on compliance by other States.  Can include 
satellite surveillance, open source information gathering, and mutually 
agreed inspections and data exchanges. 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
 The Non-Proliferation Treaty requires all non-NWS parties to conclude 
safeguards agreements with the IAEA to detect and prevent diversion of 
fissile materials from nuclear fuel cycles for weapons purposes. 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 
 The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) includes comprehensive 
verification and compliance mechanisms including: onsite and remote 
monitoring, challenge and routine inspections, establishment of a technical 
secretariat for data gathering and analysis, incentives for compliance, and 
graduated responses to non-compliance including sanctions and recourse to 
the ICJ and the Security Council for further action.  These are all 
administered by the OPCW. 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO)  
 The CTBTO establishes an international monitoring system to detect nuclear 
tests including seismic, audio-acoustic, and radio-isotope monitoring 
stations.  The CTBTO also includes procedures for dealing with non-
compliance similar to the CWC. 
Bi-lateral treaties (U.S.-Russia, Brazil-Argentina) 
 The U.S. and Russia have a range of verification measures included in the 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Treaty.  These include portal monitoring, data sharing, inspections, physical 
sampling, tracking of vehicles carrying nuclear weapons and delivery 
vehicles, and agreements on display of missiles for satellite monitoring.  The 
United States and Russia have concluded additional confidence building and 
verification mechanisms including information sharing through Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Centers. 
 Under the Agreement between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative 
Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, 
Brazil and Argentina established a joint agency for accounting and control of 
nuclear materials, which is empowered to carry out inspections of each 
country’s nuclear facilities. 
UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
 The UNGA provides a forum for states to raise issues of compliance and 
generate political pressure on states to comply with their obligations.  The 
UNGA is also a forum for discussion and development of general principles 
for verification, compliance, and for initiating negotiations on disarmament 
agreements.  
 
Rule of Force or Rule of Law? 263 
VOLUME 2 • ISSUE 1 • 2003 
UN Security Council (UNSC) 
 The UNSC can call on states to settle compliance disputes through 
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, 
resort to regional agencies or other peaceful means.  The UNSC can also 
determine that a case of non-compliance constitutes a threat to the peace 
requiring collective action, such as severance of diplomatic relations and 
interruption of economic relations.  If all measures not involving the use of 
force fail to restore peace, the Security Council can authorize the use of 
force.  In addition to Iraq’s WMD, the UNSC has, for example, acted in 
response to nuclear testing by India and Pakistan (Resolution 1172, 1998). 
UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA) 
 The UNDDA can act, when authorized by the organs of the UN, to assist in 
verification and compliance of disarmament obligations. It services meetings 
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and UNGA Disarmament and Security 
Committee, hosts the register of arms transfers, and has played an active role 
in small arms disarmament programs in Albania and Mozambique. 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
 The ICJ can make legal determinations on compliance issues.  Relevant 
cases include the Nuclear Tests Case 1974 and Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons Case 1994. 
Nuclear Weapons Convention 
 A nuclear weapons convention would provide a comprehensive regime for 
the prohibition of nuclear weapons including a range of mechanisms for 
verification and compliance.  A nuclear weapons convention has not yet 
been negotiated.  However, a Model Convention has been circulated by the 
UN Secretary-General, and the UNGA has adopted a number of resolutions 
calling for negotiations to conclude a nuclear weapons convention. 
 
 
The international community has developed collaborative mechanisms 
for the suppression of terrorism through a number of global and regional 
treaties.90  Together, these methods and mechanisms provide a range of 
alternatives to the use of force for ensuring compliance with disarmament 
and non-proliferation.  The success of these methods and mechanisms is 
indicated by the fact that compliance with disarmament and non-
proliferation obligations has generally been very high and that, in the case 
of non-compliance, force has rarely been used.91  
While there is still room for improvement in these methods and 
mechanisms, particularly relating to ensuring compliance by the NWS with 
their disarmament obligations, the main problem leading states to use force 
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to ensure compliance is not that the compliance mechanisms are inadequate, 
but that they are not sufficiently used, and often intentionally prevented 
from being used.  In the case of Iraq, the United States and United Kingdom 
undermined the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection 
Commission (UNMOVIC)92 and prevented it from completing its disarm-
ament verification work.93  They also prevented the UN General Assembly 
from meeting to address the issue94 and ruled out the use of an international 
criminal tribunal. 
VI.  MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE: THE LAW AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
Nuclear weapons, the ultimate evil, destabilize humanitarian law, 
which is the law of the lesser evil.  Nuclear war and humanitarian 
law therefore appear to me to be mutually exclusive; the existence 
of one automatically implies the non-existence of the other. 
Mohammed Bedjaoui, 
President of the International Court of Justice95 
 
A vital principle of international law is that it must be consistently 
applied.  To do otherwise is to remove it from the realm of law and relegate 
it to being another tool of the powerful to subjugate the weak.   
International law cannot be utilized to support State practices 
which deviate from fundamental principles and mainstream 
aspirations.  Otherwise we would be legitimizing the principle that 
might is right and we would have to come to the frightening 
conclusion that international law is on the side of the powerful, as 
interpreted by the powerful.96 
While Iraq had legal obligations to eliminate its WMD programs, and the 
international community had a right and responsibility to act to ensure 
compliance with such obligations, such action is only valid if it is also 
undertaken to ensure compliance by other States with their obligations to 
eliminate WMD programs—in particular the obligations of the NWS to 
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eliminate their nuclear weapons programs, which are far more advanced 
than those of Iraq. 
The Security Council, in Resolution 687, setting forth the terms of the 
ceasefire that ended the Gulf War, acknowledged that the elimination of 
Iraq’s WMD is not an end in itself, but “represents steps towards the goal of 
establishing in the Middle East a zone free from WMD.”97  Yet there has 
been no action to ensure the elimination of Israel’s nuclear weapons 
programs.  In fact, the Security Council has not even condemned the 
imprisonment of Mordechai Vanunu, the nuclear technician who exposed 
the Israeli nuclear weapons program. 
Similarly, the Security Council has failed to take any action to ensure 
compliance by the NWS with their obligations to eliminate nuclear 
weapons.  This obligation was undertaken by the NWS when they ratified 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty,98 and was affirmed by the ICJ in 1996 when it 
unanimously determined that there is an obligation on all states to “pursue 
in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear 
disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international 
control.”99 
The ICJ also declared that “[t]he threat or use of nuclear weapons would 
generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.”100   
The only situation in which the court could not clearly determine whether 
the threat or use would necessarily be illegal was “in an extreme 
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a state would be 
at stake,”101 and even in this circumstance the nature of use, including the 
size of the nuclear weapons and the location of use, would have to be such 
that would not violate humanitarian laws.  These laws hold that the use of 
any weapon must: 
 Be proportional to the initial attack; 
 Be necessary for effective self-defence; 
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 Not be directed at civilians or civilian objects; 
 Be used in a manner that makes it possible to 
discriminate between military targets and civilian non-
targets,  
and that the use of any weapon must not:  
 Cause unnecessary or aggravated suffering to 
combatants; 
 Affect states that are not parties to the conflict; or  
 Cause severe, widespread, or long-term damage to the 
environment.102 
The humanitarian laws of warfare are considered to be part of customary 
international law, meaning that they are binding on all states.  They are 
further affirmed within the military law of most states and in a number of 
international conventions including The Hague Convention, Geneva Con-
vention, Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and 
Yugoslavia, and the Statute for the International Criminal Court (“Rome 
Statute”).  Thus, not only do the NWS have an obligation to eliminate their 
nuclear arsenals, but to not use their arsenals pending such elimination.  
The United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia in particular 
are in violation of these obligations.  All four states maintain policies of 
First Use of nuclear weapons, and to use them in a variety of circumstances 
far beyond the extreme circumstance identified by the ICJ as the only 
circumstance which the Court could not affirm illegality.103   They also 
maintain nuclear weapons the nature of which would make their use, even 
in such an extreme circumstance, in violation of the humanitarian laws of 
warfare. 104   It is arguable that other nuclear weapons–possessing states 
China, India, Israel and Pakistan are also in violation of the ICJ opinion.105 
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VII.  CATCHING THE BIG FLIES: IMPLEMENTING THE LAW ON 
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 
When it comes to those very weapons of mass destruction which 
pose a greater threat to human rights and the environment than 
anything else imaginable, these [Nuclear Weapons] States ask you 
to set aside that body of principles and rules so carefully put in 
place over the past 50 years.  They ask you, in effect, to re-situate 
yourself in 1945, to ignore all subsequent developments and to 
follow Balzac's dubious proposition, “that laws are spider webs 
through which the big flies pass and the little ones get caught.” 
Phillipe Sands106 
 
After the ICJ affirmed the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons and the obligation to negotiate for their elimination, one might 
expect the UN Security Council to take action to enforce the law on this 
issue.  In light of the fact that the five acknowledged NWS each hold a veto 
power in the Security Council, it is unlikely that this will happen.  “[T]he 
political role of the Security Council is clearly dominated by a powerful 
group of countries, the nuclear powers, and in that context there is little 
hope of placing the issue of nuclear weapons before such a Council for an 
objective and fair consideration.”107  This does not mean, however, that 
there are no other possibilities for advancing the rule of law in international 
and national forums.  For instance, the ICJ decision has led to action in the 
UN General Assembly, international treaty fora, domestic parliaments and 
courts, and by non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  
A.  UN General Assembly 
The UN General Assembly responded to the 1996 ICJ decision by 
adopting a resolution that called on states to implement the decision by 
commencing negotiations that would lead to the conclusion of a nuclear 
weapons convention—a treaty prohibiting the possession, threat or use of 
nuclear weapons, and providing a program for their elimination.108  The 
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resolution has been reaffirmed every year since 1996 by an overwhelming 
majority of states, including some of the NWS. 
B.  International Treaties 
State parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty met in 2000 to review 
progress in implementing the treaty’s key provisions of non-proliferation 
and disarmament.  A group of states called the New Agenda Coalition109 
generated considerable political momentum for a disarmament agenda.  
This group successfully moved the NWS to make an unequivocal 
commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons and to take a number of 
immediate steps towards this goal.  The 1996 ICJ decision was used as an 
important tool to help generate the political momentum and was specifically 
referred to in the final outcome of the meeting.110 
During the negotiations of the Rome Statute for the International 
Criminal Court (ICC),111 the United States proposed that any employment 
of chemical weapons, biological weapons, and expanding bullets in wartime 
be included as a war crime under the jurisdiction of the court.112  A number 
of states argued that nuclear weapons should be added to this list on the 
basis of the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion and that landmines should be added 
on the basis that they do not discriminate between soldiers and civilians.113  
In recognition of the fact that the NWS and most of their allies would not be 
able to ratify the statute if it included employment of nuclear weapons as a 
war crime, the proposal was dropped, and instead the ICC includes the 
employment of “indiscriminate weapons” as a crime.114  This definition 
could be interpreted to include nuclear weapons.  On ratifying the statute, 
France attempted to exclude any threat or use of nuclear weapons from ICC 
jurisdiction.115  In response, New Zealand made a declaration on ratifi-
cation, citing the ICJ opinion in support of its argument that the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons could not be excluded.  This opinion stated: 
It is the view of the Government of New Zealand that it would be 
inconsistent with principles of international humanitarian law to 
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purport to limit the scope of article 8, in particular article 8(2)(b), 
to events that involve conventional weapons only. The 
Government of New Zealand finds support for its view in the 
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996) and 
draws attention to paragraph 86, in particular, where the Court 
stated that the conclusion that humanitarian law did not apply to 
such weapons “would be incompatible with the intrinsically 
humanitarian character of the legal principles in question which 
permeates the entire law of armed conflict and applies to all forms 
of warfare and to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of 
the present and those of the future.”116 
C.  Parliaments 
A number of parliaments, including the UK House of Commons, United 
States House of Representatives, and European Parliament, have taken 
actions to encourage their governments to implement their disarmament 
obligations.  These include the introduction or adoption of resolutions 
referring to the ICJ decision and calling for its implementation through 
negotiations leading to a Nuclear Weapons Convention.117 
D.  Citizen Weapons Inspections, Disarmament Actions, and Domestic 
Courts 
The ICJ decision has encouraged anti-nuclear activists to take new and 
stronger actions against nuclear weapons facilities in the NWS and in the 
territories of allies where nuclear weapons are deployed.  Using the 
precedent of United Nations weapons inspectors in Iraq that were 
empowered by the Security Council to ascertain whether Iraq was 
complying with its disarmament obligations, NGOs have formed teams of 
citizen weapons inspectors to determine whether the NWS are 
implementing their disarmament obligations as affirmed by the ICJ. 
These inspectors have experienced similar difficulties as those faced by 
the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) inspectors, such as 
obstruction, denial of access, and refusal by the authorities to release 
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adequate information.  The citizen weapons inspectors face an additional 
hurdle: the NWS’ refusal to eliminate their arsenals anytime in the near 
future as required.  Some citizen weapons inspectors have been arrested, but 
they are usually discharged in order to prevent the generation of negative 
publicity.118  
Some NGOs, in particular the “Ploughshares” activists,119 enter nuclear 
weapons facilities and conduct a “disarmament action,” once they have 
confirmed there are nuclear weapons systems on site and that the 
government is not implementing its disarmament obligations.  This does not 
aim to go as far as the UNSCOM inspectors, who physically destroyed the 
WMD they found in Iraq.  Ploughshares actions are more symbolic, 
undertaken to draw attention to the illegality of the weapons systems and to 
generate political momentum for nuclear disarmament.  However, some 
nuclear equipment or support equipment is usually damaged and the 
activists arrested. 
The courts have taken a range of approaches to these cases, with some 
defendants’ cases being dismissed on technicalities, some being convicted, 
and some acquitted. 120   An example of an acquittal is the Trident 
Ploughshares case in Scotland, where the judge concluded that “the threat 
or use of Trident . . . is an infringement of international and customary law.  
If Trident is illegal . . . [the activists] had the obligation in terms of 
international law to do whatever little they could to stop the deployment 
and use of nuclear weapons.”121 
VIII.  WRAPPING IT UP: A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONVENTION 
The goal [of nuclear disarmament] is no longer utopian and it is 
the duty of all to seek to attain it more actively than ever. 
Mohammed Bedjaoui,  
President of the International Court of Justice122 
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In its action to implement the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion, the UN 
General Assembly called on all states to commence negotiations leading to 
the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the 
development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat, 
or use of nuclear weapons, and providing for their elimination.123  Such a 
convention would provide a path towards nuclear disarmament as called for 
by the ICJ.  This General Assembly resolution is supported by an 
overwhelming majority of countries and public opinion polls in countries 
not yet supporting the resolution show support of 80 percent.124  An appeal 
calling for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons has gained over 60 million 
signatures, making it the largest petition in the world.125 
In 1997, a consortium of lawyers, scientists, and disarmament experts, 
convened by the Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, released a Model 
Nuclear Weapons Convention (Model Convention). 126   This Model 
Conven-tion outlines general obligations of states and individuals under a 
nuclear weapons abolition regime and a phased program for dismantling 
and destroying existing nuclear stockpiles.  It also outlines control 
mechanisms for nuclear facilities and materials, elements of a verification 
regime, protection measures for whistleblowers, dispute resolution and 
enforcement procedures, measures for dealing with delivery vehicles and 
dual use materials, national implementation measures, an agency for 
overseeing the convention, entry into force options, relationship to other 
nuclear related agreements and regimes, and a protocol concerning nuclear 
energy.127 
The Model Convention was circulated by the United Nations as “an 
effective and helpful instrument in the deliberative process for the 
implementation of General Assembly Resolution 51/45 M (on follow-up to 
the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion).”128  Since then, the Model Convention has 
stimulated considerable discussion on the feasibility and practicalities of 
nuclear abolition by academics, scientists, government officials (including 
from the NWS), and civil society representatives. 129   The Model 
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Convention encompasses successful elements from other legal regimes, 
such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, ICC, IAEA Safeguards, and 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, and it suggests a number of 
groundbreaking solutions to problems that have thwarted other nuclear 
disarmament negotiations.  
A key aim of the Model Convention is to demonstrate that nuclear 
disarmament is indeed no longer utopian and to move officials and leaders 
of the NWS to consider not whether nuclear weapons should be abolished, 
but the practicalities of how such a task could be accomplished.  It outlines 
legal approaches and mechanisms that could be used to address the 
concerns and situations that prompt the NWS to maintain their nuclear 
weapons and doctrines.  These concerns typically include verification, 
enforcement, breakout, nuclear terrorism, safeguarding nuclear materials, 
and nuclear research. 
A.  Verification 
The verification system envisaged by the Model Convention would be 
more comprehensive than verification regimes established by the 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, IAEA, Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty Organisation, and the UN Security Council.  It would include 
declarations and reports from states, routine inspections, challenge 
inspections, on-site sensors, satellite photography, radionuclide sampling 
and other remote sensing, information sharing with other organizations, and 
citizen reporting.  In addition, an international monitoring system would be 
established to gather information.130 
Currently, a key difficulty in verification is that many states, including 
the NWS and the states not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have not 
placed their nuclear facilities under any inspection regime.  A number of 
other states are yet to accept the strengthened IAEA safeguards agreements.  
A nuclear weapons convention would require all facilities to be placed 
under a robust verification regime. 
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A novel feature of the Model Convention is the focus it places on the 
responsibility of individual citizens for verification.  Citizens often have the 
motivation to determine nuclear activities that governments might oversee.  
An example of successful citizen verification occurred in 1995, 
immediately following the agreement made at the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
Review Conference by all NWS to refrain from nuclear testing: the 
Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) used 
satellite photographs bought from Russia and noticed that China was 
preparing for a nuclear test. 
A government can often hide its activities from foreign governments, but 
it is very difficult for it to hide them from its own scientists and other 
citizens.  For example, evidence confirming that Israel was building nuclear 
weapons was revealed not by a governmental or international agency, but 
by an Israeli worker at the Dimona nuclear facility.131  The Model Conven-
tion includes obligations for individuals to report nuclear activities in 
violation of the Convention, and protection for individuals exposing any 
violations.132 
B.  Enforcement Mechanisms 
Dissatisfaction by some governments of treaty-based regimes often 
focuses on lack of confidence in the enforcement mechanisms.  This is not 
surprising given that most current disarmament and non-proliferation 
treaties have very weak enforcement mechanisms.133  The Model Conven-
tion, on the other hand, envisages a range of compliance and enforcement 
mechanisms, including restrictions of states’ rights with regard to the use of 
nuclear weapons, suspension of technical cooperation, and sanctions.  It 
includes a provision making the threat or use of nuclear weapons a “threat 
to the peace” requiring action by the UN Security Council.134  In addition, it 
makes the threat or use of nuclear weapons a crime for which individuals 
would be held responsible either through domestic courts or through the 
ICC.135  Thus, the Model Convention aims to establish mechanisms that 
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would ensure compliance and prevent breakout.  This includes incentives 
for compliance, security assurances to prevent a perceived requirement for 
nuclear weapons, and irreversible preventive controls on dismantled 
weapons and fissile material to make it technically difficult to breakout.136 
C.  Prevention  Mechanisms 
A nuclear abolition regime needs to address not only the possibility of 
states breaking out and developing or retaining a nuclear weapons option, 
but also the possibility of non-state actors acquiring or building a nuclear 
weapon, then using it.  The increasing risk of terrorists acquiring a nuclear 
bomb has been highlighted by a number of observers.137  Attempts have 
been made to develop an international mechanism to deal with the risks of 
non-state acquisition and/or threat of use of nuclear weapons.  These efforts 
have floundered, partly due to resistance by many states to the hypocrisy of 
the NWS prohibiting non-state nuclear programs while retaining their own 
programs.  It is also partly due to the difficulties of developing preventive 
measures while the NWS refuse to submit their nuclear facilities to 
safeguards and their nuclear stockpiles to adequate verification.  Thus, the 
New Agenda Coalition has concluded that  
the retention of nuclear weapons carries the inherent risk of 
contributing to proliferation and falling into the hands of non-State 
actors . . . the only real guarantee against these weapons is their 
complete elimination and the assurance that they will never be 
used or produced again.138  
The comprehensive preventive controls implemented through a nuclear 
weapons convention would make it difficult, if not impossible, for non-state 
actors to acquire or build a nuclear weapon.  Unlike chemical or biological 
weapons, nuclear weapons require specific materials—highly enriched 
uranium or plutonium.  These materials cannot be manufactured easily and 
are not required for other purposes.  Thus, under a nuclear weapons 
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convention, highly enriched uranium and plutonium would become 
proscribed and production facilities closed.139 
D.  Conclusion  
The drafters of the Model Convention do not claim to have all the 
answers to the security concerns of the NWS and recognize that there are 
still “questions that are yet to be fully answered.”140  However, advocates of 
the Convention envisage states bringing their security concerns relating to 
nuclear weapons to the negotiating table, rather than using such concerns to 
block progress and continue a destabilizing and potentially catastrophic 
path of nuclear possession.  In resolving security concerns through 
negotiations and the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention, states 
would have less of a need to maintain military options and capabilities to 
respond, either unilaterally or in alliance, to the current threats from 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
The development of a nuclear weapons convention can be part of a 
global development of legal instruments that are gradually constructing an 
international order conducive to the interests of all states and global civil 
society rather than one of competition and conflict—one that truly is based 
on the Rule of Law rather than the Rule of Force. 
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